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ABSTRACT 
I discuss the second of the three theses advanced by Anscombe in ‘Modern Moral 
Philosophy’. The focus is the nature of entities to which – if Anscombe’s diagnosis is 
correct – ought and cognate modals are assumed by modern moral philosophers to refer. I 
reconstruct the alternative account offered by Anscombe of viable and justified 
‘Aristotelian’ modals – as contrasted with mysterious and unjustified ‘Kantian’ modals; I 
discuss the nature and status of ‘Aristotelian necessity’ to which such legitimate modals 
refer to. I conclude with the claims that Anscombe’s account of modern moral philosophy 
is viciously parochial, reducing it to Oxford philosophy from the Thirties and Forties and 
its immediate antecedents; that her historical reconstruction is vitiated by lack of awareness 
of the existence of law-views of morality preceding Christian theology, artful anticipation of 
secularization in order to fit her picture of modern moral philosophy as the ‘day after’ of 
Christianity; that Aquinas’s and her own view of natural morality as made of rational 
moral judgments laws is incompatible with both her predilection for ‘divine law’ instead of 
plain down-to-earth ‘natural law’; that her strained reconstruction of a Christian-Jewish-
Stoic view of morality as law promulgated by God has little to share with any 
reconstruction of the Biblical moral traditions meeting academic standard and in more 
detail there is no possible translation of Torah as Law; and that her criticism hits just 
targets from the old little British world she was familiar with, while leaving Kantian ethics 
unaffected.  
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1. ANSCOMBE’S THREE THESES 
Anscombe’s work is a crossroad from which various alleys in contemporary 
ethics and related subjects depart: action theory, moral psychology, neo-
naturalism, virtue ethics, so-called divine-command theory (in fact a theory 
with many critics and virtually no proponent), and yet, the discussion about 
precisely what kind of ethical theory Anscombe supported is still yielding a 
flow of literature. My pre-comprehension, not argued in this chapter, is that 
Anscombe is not a proponent of virtue ethics, an ethical theory where the most 
important concept is that of virtue, but instead the discoverer of an 
astonishingly simple idea, namely that morality is no more a simple 
phenomenon with its own essence than several other phenomena in human 
life. Ethics is inherently a theory of the complexity of human action. As 
O’Brien aptly summarizes, her critique of modern ethics points at an 
alternative  
picture of ethics in which neither virtues, consequences, nor rules serve a more 
basic explanatory role than the others. She is a pluralist about ethical categories, 
which implies that virtues, consequences, and rules answer to complementary 
and mutually implicating explanatory needs. A human action may be bad either 
if it springs from a vicious disposition, produces certain bad consequences, or 
violates a rule; it can be good only by avoiding all of these pitfalls1. 
 “Modern moral philosophy”, her famous 1958 essay, is an attack on ethical 
theories from Butler up to Ross and Hare2, claiming that there is a shared 
approach to moral issues in this tradition and this is not the only possible one, 
and besides that the disappointing state of the art in moral philosophy 
depends on a few mistaken assumptions. These are: a) forgetfulness of 
dispositions or virtues, b) unjustified primacy of rules and obligation, c) denial 
of the existence of classes of absolutely forbidden actions. Anscombe’s essay 
defends three theses: the first is that a satisfactory “philosophy of psychology” 
is required before we may start doing ethics in any profitable way; the second 
claims that the force of “moral obligation and moral duty” arises from oblivion 
of its origin; the third declares that consequentialism, the claim that the moral 
value of actions depends on their consequences and accordingly any kind of 
 
1 M.B. O’Brien, “On Obligation and the Virtues of Law” in L. Gormally, D.A. Jones, R. 
Teichmann, The Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2016) 75-97, 
pp. 75-76. 
2 In fact by “modern” moral philosophy she means no more than early twentieth-century 
Oxford philosophy with its predecessors. Cf S. Cremaschi, “Elizabeth Anscombe on 
Consequentialism and Absolute Prohibitions”, Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, 47 (2012) 7-39, 
pp. 10-18. 
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action may be examined as a possibly admissible or dutiful kind of action, is 
the mark of all contemporary kinds of Anglo-Saxon ethics after Sidgwick3.  
2. FORGETFULNESS AND THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 
I discuss here a point related mainly to the second thesis, namely what kind 
of realm of alleged moral facts lies behind the mysterious moral ought, and 
what kind of objective reality lies at the basis of ethics understood in an 
admissible sense. In a word, what kind of moral realism is implied by 
Anscombe’s ‘naturalism’. 
The thesis claims that the force of ought arises from forgetfulness of its 
origins and accordingly the moral sense of ‘ought’ and cognate concepts are 
“survivals, or derivatives from survivals”, from an earlier conception of ethics. 
To have “a law conception of ethics” one should assume that “what is needed 
for conformity with the virtues” is required by divine law and – she adds – “it 
is not possible to have such a conception unless you believe in God as a law-
giver; like Jews, Stoics and Christians”4, but, “if such a conception is dominant 
for many centuries, and then is given up, it is a natural result that the concepts 
of ‘obligation’, of being bound or required as by a law, should remain though 
they had lost their root”5. Thus, modern moral philosophy is an unstable 
building. Its basic concepts, such as those of duty and obligation and the 
moral ought – never occur in Aristotle. They are instead relics left by another 
conception, centred on the idea of divine law, which “was found among the 
Stoics, and became generally current through Christianity, whose ethical 
notions come from the Torah”6. Anscombe’s proposal is  
using ought in a non-emphatic fashion, and not in a special ‘moral’ sense; of 
discarding the term ‘wrong’ in a ‘moral sense’, and using such notions as 
‘unjust’7. 
 
3 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, in Human Life, Action and Ethics, ed. by 
M. Geach and L. Gormally (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005) 169-94, p. 169, on the first thesis 
cf S. Cremaschi, “Anscombe on the philosophy of psychology as propaedeutic to ethics”, in M. 
Galletti (ed.) La mente morale. Persone, ragioni, virtù (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 
2014) pp. 17-62; on the third S. Cremaschi, “Elizabeth Anscombe on Consequentialism and 
Absolute Prohibitions”.  
4 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, p. 176 
5 Ibid. 
6 G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention (1957) (Cambridge, MASS: Harvard University Press) 2000, 
fn 1. 
7 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, p. 188. 
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Anscombe’s story about forgetfulness may have sounded a bit weird to mid-
twentieth century Oxford ears, but would have sounded more familiar to 
anybody conversant with nineteenth-century German philosophy. There had 
been in Germany a strand of reflection on the role of oblivion in the life of 
mind, inspired by the Romantic reaction against early-modern cult of mnemo-
techniques8, a strand to which Schopenhauer had given a decisive 
contribution. He was impressed by Rousseau’s remarks about the role of 
forgetfulness in the process of learning. It is well-known how Èmile was not 
expected by his tutor to learn anything by hearth. His early medical interests 
concentrating on mental illness lead Schopenhauer in The World as Will and 
Representation, book III, § 36, to formulate the diagnosis that “madness is a 
disease affecting particularly memory”9 creating gaps in the patient’s memory, 
which are filled up in turn with fantastic representations. The disease itself was 
a reaction to unbearable pain, a means of forgetting what was too painful to 
the patient. In the Supplements to book I, ch. 14 he adds that in healthy minds 
too most mental processes are constantly forgotten, that is, the processing of 
raw materials received from outside takes place “in the darken depth and is 
carried out as unconsciously as the transformation of food into bodily 
humours and substance”10. 
In Feuerbach we meet speculations about the history of the European 
modern mind, suggesting that the values of modern Europe were a Christian 
legacy somehow secularized though oblivion of the originally religious 
character of such values, and Nietzsche seems to draw inspiration from both 
Feuerbach and Schopenhauer when he writes that what makes institutions, 
norms and values appear to be justified beyond any doubt is a result of a 
process through which their original justification is forgotten; modern 
civilization is just secularised Christianity, and humanists and socialists are 
priests in drag11. In On the Foundation of Morality Schopehauer had argued, 
against Kant, that to assume the existence of moral laws is tantamount to a 
petitio principii. The only true meaning of ‘law’ is that of a human institution 
based on human arbitrary will, and derived, metaphorical sense is that of 
natural law. The only law really existing for human will is “the law of 
motivation, an instance of the law of causality, namely causality mediated by 
 
8 Cf H. Weinrich, “Vergessen, das”, in J. Ritter and K. Gründer (eds.) Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Philosophie, 12 vols. (Basel: Schwabe, 1971-2004) cols. 671-675.  
9 A. Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1819) in Sämtliche Werke, 7 vols., 
ed. by A. Hübscher (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1937-1961) vol. II: 226 (translations are mine). 
10 Ibid., vol. III: 148. 
11 F. Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches II (1886) in Sämtliche Werke, 15 vols., ed. 
by G. Colli and M. Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980) vol. IV\3: § 40.  
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knowledge”12, and, “for the introduction into ethics of the notions of law, 
prescription and ought, there is no other origin than one extraneous to 
philosophy, namely Moses’s Decalogue”13, “there is no doubt that philosophical 
ethics has been unconsciously moulded by theological ethics”14 , and Kant 
“tacitly and stealthily borrowed this imperative kind of ethics from theological 
Morals”15.  
The young Wittgenstein’s ethical views followed closely Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy16. Ethics – he declares – belongs, together with religion and 
aesthetics, to the ‘mystical’, a domain outside the ‘world’ or the ‘totality of 
facts’. Language is able just to describe the world and “In it there is no value – 
and if there were, it would be of no value”17. Values “lie outside of the world”18. 
This is the reason why “there can be no ethical proposition”19. To give a fuller 
picture, we should also consider the Lecture on ethics of 1930 where changes 
introduced in those years in his philosophy are reflected. It is well-known that 
the binary alternative between descriptive use of language and the impossible 
attempt to use language in order to mention what is outside the world, he 
admitted a plurality of meanings depending on the use we make of linguistic 
expressions. This carried the possibility of a distinction between relative value 
judgments and absolute value judgements according to which “every 
judgment of relative value is a mere statement of facts and can therefore be put 
in such a form that it loses all the appearance of a judgment of value”20, while 
“no statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value”21. 
What is still true to the philosophy of the Tractatus is the idea that ethical 
propositions, even though propositions of a paradoxical kind are in a strict 
sense meaningless. This is their “peculiar essence” in so far as by them we try 
“to go beyond the world, that is, beyond meaningful language”, and ethics “in 
 
12 A. Schopenhauer, Über die Grundlage der Moral, in Sämtliche Werke, vol. IV: 121. 
13 Ibid., p. 122 
14 Ibid., p. 122. 
15 Ibid., p. 125. 
16 On Wittgenstein’s Schopenhauerism cf A. S. Janik, “Schopenhauer and the early 
Wittgenstein”, Philosophical Studies, 15 (1966) 76-95; E.S. Morris, “Schopenhauer’s impact on 
Wittgenstein”, Journal of the History of Philosophy”, 7 (1969) 285-302; M. Micheletti, Lo 
schopenhauerismo di Ludwig Wittgenstein (Padova: La Garangola, 1973); B. Magee, The 
philosophy of Schopenhauer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, second edition 1998) pp. 310-40.  
17 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) (Routledge: London 1961) 6.41 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 6.42, 6.421. 
20 L. Wittgenstein, Lecture on Ethics, ed. by E. Zamuner, E.V. Di Lascio, and D.K. Levy 
(London: Wiley Blackwell, 2014) pp. 44. 
21 Ibid., p. 43. 
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so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate 
meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable can be no science”22.  
And this is the position in which, for example, someone finds himself 
when he looks for definitions in ethics or aesthetics that correspond to our 
concepts.  
In this sort of predicament, always ask yourself: How did we learn the 
meaning of this word (‘good’ for instance)? From what sort of examples? 
In what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to see that the 
word must have a family of meanings23.  
The same holds for the word ‘good’, Moore’s Troy-horse for his final assault 
on naturalistic and metaphysical ethics. His discovery of a unique meaning 
attached to the word is simply a blunder, for  
it could be said that the use of the word ‘good’ (in an ethical sense) is 
a combination of a very large number of interrelated games, each of them as 
it were a facet of the use. What makes a single concept here is precisely the 
connection, the relationship, between these facets24.  
The only way to ‘define’ the word ‘good’ is by providing examples where 
use is made of the terms. We always find some closeness, contiguity, familiarity 
among elements of the series, what is not tantamount to any element shared 
by all its elements. That is, there may be  
nothing in common between the two ends of the series. The way in which you 
use ‘good’ in particular case is partly defined by the topic you’re talking of. Each 
way in which A can convince B that x is good, fixes a meaning in which ‘good’ is 
used – fixes the grammar of the discussion […] Nothing would be more 
astounding, than if ‘good’ had the same meaning always, considering the ways 
we learn it. So it may be very difficult to find anything in common between two 
uses of ’good’, but there will be gradual transitions from one to the other, which 
take the place of something in common25. 
Thus, at the time of the Philosophical Investigations, he still viewed ethics 
as the adoption of a framework within which we may ‘see’ that life has a 
 
22 Ibid., p. 51. 
23 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. by P.M.S. Hacker and J. Schulte (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, 4th ed.) § 77. 
24 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, ed. by R. Rhees and A. Kenny (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1974) p. 36. 
25 Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1933. From the Notes of G. E. Moore, ed. by G. 
Citron, B. Rogers, and D.G. Stern (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) May 5 1933; 
cf. D.G. Stern, “Wittgenstein's Lectures on Ethics, Cambridge 1933”, Wittgenstein Studien , 4 
(2013) 191-206. 
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meaning, and thus still as coextensive with religion and aesthetics. In fact he 
still writes sentences like from his earlier phase, for example: “If anything is 
good, then it is also godly. My own ethics may summarized in this way, even 
though in a somewhat queer way”26. But he is also aware now that there are a 
number of ways and senses in which we may discuss issues from a moral point 
of view, and no essence or definition is needed in order to be able to recognize 
the ethical dimension at stake. 
Coming back to Anscombe, the Wittgensteinian mood in which the second 
thesis was formulated should be kept in mind in order not to mistake the 
meaning buried in a rather cryptic formulation. The thesis is one more 
example of a consistent strategy consisting in trying to deflate a number of 
philosophical problems by showing how concepts are no more than networks 
of ‘similar’ ideas and the point of philosophy as a practice is precisely 
dissolving non-existent essences and self-contained concepts from whose use 
traditional philosophical problems arise; and after that there is no different 
philosophical solution to be put forth, but we come back to plain ordinary 
language comprehension of issues depurated from misunderstandings and 
everybody will see how things are. In other words, what Anscombe had in 
mind is that Moral Philosophy rests on a mistake.  
It is as well to add that, even though the substance of the second thesis 
comes from Schopenhauer via Wittgenstein, Anscombe might have never read 
anything by Schopenhauer and just have heard directly from Wittgenstein the 
story about forgetfulness as the source of the moral law’s force27. Roger Crisp 
reports a private communication by Peter Geach, her husband, to the effect 
that “as far as he knows, Anscombe had little direct knowledge of 
Schopenhauer’s work, but that he and Wittgenstein would certainly have 
talked to her about Schopenhauer”28. It is true that an English translation was 
available of On the basis of Morality29 but no direct reference is found in 
Anscombe’s writings. 
 
26 L. Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen uber die Farben; uber Gewissheit; Zettel; Vermischte 
Bemerkungen (Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp, 1990, p. 454 (the translation is mine). 
27 Ch. Pigden, “Anscombe on `Ought'”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 38, no. 150 (1988) 20-
41, pp. 32-33; R. Crisp, “Does Modern Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, in A. O’Hear 
(ed.) Modern Moral Philosophy. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 54 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) 75-94, pp. 77-78.  
28 R. Crisp, “Does Modern Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, p. 77 fn 7; P. Geach, The 
Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) discusses Schopenhauer at pp. 28, 30-
32, 144, 148-149, more often than other more obvious authorities on the subject. 
29 A. Schopenhauer, The Basis of Morality, tr. with intr. and notes by A.B. Bullock (London: 
Swan Sonnenschein & Co, 1903).  
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3. ANSCOMBE AND WITTGENSTEIN ON ETHICS AND LANGUAGE 
Anscombe was well-aware of both the distance between Wittgenstein and 
Logical Empiricism as well as of his Schopenhauerism. And in fact, in 
“Modern Moral Philosophy” she puts to work effectively the lesson from the 
Philosophical Investigations that essences are a delusion and that there “may 
be nothing in common between the two ends of the series” exemplifying uses 
of words when dismantling the mysterious emphatic ought following the 
strategy adopted by Wittgenstein for good. 
One of the first points she makes in ethics, in Intention, is that ‘should’, 
which may be assumed to render Aristotle’s δεῖ, is a “rather light word with an 
unlimited context of application”. The list of examples she gives is that 
athletes should keep in training, pregnant women watch their weight, film stars 
their publicity, that one should brush one’s teeth, that one should (not) be 
fastidious about one’s pleasures, that one should (not) tell ‘necessary’ lies, that 
chairmen in discussion should tactfully suppress irrelevancies, that someone 
learning arithmetic should practise a certain neatness, that machinery needs 
lubrification, that meals ought to be punctual, that we should (not) see the 
methods of ‘Linguistic analysis’ in Aristotle’s philosophy30.  
The point she is making is that there is nothing specifically ethical in such 
use, as there is nothing necessarily ethical in Aristotle’s idea of a practical 
syllogism. Both have to do with practical knowledge, not ethics. The set of 
examples introduced by Anscombe is probably understood as one of 
Wittgenstein’s series of terms constituting ‘families’ bound together just by 
‘family resemblances’, where there is nothing in common between the two 
ends of the series. Yet “the ordinary (and quite indispensable) terms ‘should’, 
‘needs’, ‘ought’, ‘must’”31 are used in meaningful ways in everyday life and 
might be correctly used also when discussing ethical questions if depurated 
from a sort of deposit of further unjustified ‘meaning’. In order to better grasp 
the point of Anscombe’s account of the meaning of “ought”, it is necessary to 
mention Philippa Foot’s account of “good” in “Moral Arguments”. Her claim 
is that descriptive terms such as mendacious, unchaste, unjust might be used 
instead of “bad” and they would not raise the same troubles32. Note that Foot 
was carrying out a careful criticism of Moore’s naturalistic fallacy argument, 
sharply contrasting with Anscombe’s parallel but somewhat expeditious 
 
30 G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention, p. 64. 
31 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, p. 175. 
32 Ph. Foot, “Moral Arguments” (1958) in Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002) 
96-109. 
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refutation of Hume’s law carried out in a few lines of “Modern Moral 
Philosophy”.  
Before discussing Anscombe on Hume, let me compare the athletes-and-
pregnant women example quoted above with a well-known passage from the 
Philosophical Investigations. Here Wittgenstein declares: “What we do is to 
bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use”33. What 
Anscombe wants to do is taking such terms as ‘should’, ‘needs’, ‘ought’, ‘must’ 
and doing with them what Wittgenstein recommended for such words as 
‘knowledge’, ‘being’, ‘object’, ‘I’, namely, instead of trying to grasp the essence 
of the thing as philosophers delude themselves into doing, “always ask oneself: 
is the word ever actually used in this way in the language which is its original 
home?”34. Following this lead, I would suggest that she was trying here to do for 
the word ‘ought’ what Wittgenstein had tried to do for the word ‘good’. The 
latter had Moore in mind – in fact, he had him sitting in flesh and bones in his 
classroom in the Thirties and was trying to undo his argument for the 
impossibility to define ‘good’. Anscombe, instead, had Hare as an opponent, 
and was trying to pay him the same favour as regards his thesis of the original 
character of prescription, or the impossibility of any shift from ‘is’ to ‘ought’.  
The implication of her argument is that there is no special philosophical 
problem behind such terms as ‘should’, ‘needs’, ‘ought’, ‘must’, and that 
propositions where they occur only formulate ethical questions when they refer 
to virtues and vices, goodness or wickedness of human actions, passions and 
dispositions. She writes: 
All human action in concreto is either good or bad simpliciter. There is no 
need to insert ‘morally’ and say ‘morally good or bad’. The term ‘moral’ adds no 
sense to the phrase, because we are talking about human actions, and the ‘moral’ 
goodness of an action is nothing but its goodness as a human action. I mean: the 
goodness with which it is a good action35. 
Thus, the ‘mesmeric force’ of the word ‘ought’ in modern moral philosophy 
is superadded and unnecessary.  
While writing the above remarks, Anscombe was aware of Wittgenstein’s 
considerations on ethics as well as of his dependence on Schopenhauer. Indeed 
one of her books is among the first sources we have on Wittgenstein’s 
 
33 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §116 
34 Ibid. 
35 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Action, Intention and ‘Double Effect’” (1981) in Human Life, Action 
and Ethics, ed. by M. Geach and L. Gormally (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005) pp. 207-26, p. 
212. 
60        SERGIO CREMASCHI 
 
Schopenhauerism36. In her commentary to the Tractatus she recalls 
Wittgenstein’s view according to which, since there is no logical connection 
between the will and the world, such connection must be a purely accidental 
one. She adds that this consideration had a bearing on his ideas about ethics. 
The point is that the will, as it appears in the world, is a mere phenomenon 
only of interest to psychology, while if 
I were suddenly so paralysed that nothing happened, the will would remain – I 
should still have willed; but this will in not merely an impotent thought of the 
thing’s happening, but it is good or evil […] But of that we cannot speak because 
values lies outside the world and can only express what is in the world. Now […] 
had he only been concerned with the fact that ‘good’ and ‘evil’ could not fit into 
the picture theory, he might have done as many positivists did, and debunked 
value altogether’37.  
And later on, she adds that  
‘action’, in the ethical sense, is something independent of what happens; and 
this is the bearer of good and evil. Thus the ‘will that is the bearer of the ethical’ 
(Tractatus, 6.423) belongs among the transcendentals of the Tractatus, along 
with the mystical and the meaning of life38.  
Peter Geach had written that the ‘most serious misinterpretation’ by the 
first Italian translator of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus had been that ‘the mysticism 
of the Tractatus is regarded not as anything integral to Wittgenstein's thought 
but as an illogical reaction against the irrationally self-imposed limits of a 
narrow positivistic philosophy’39 while the truth is, instead, that ‘the Tractatus 
is full of Schopenhauerian theses and ideas’40. 
To sum up, Anscombe’s second thesis sounds like Nietzsche’s genealogy of 
morals turned upside down. Instead of claiming, like Nietzsche, that modern 
humanism is a kind of implicit theology and that it should take the final step 
toward true Atheism, she argues, on the contrary, that modern humanism is a 
kind of confused theology. I will illustrate how the main way out of confusion 
she proposes – which I would call her official moral ontology – is not a return 
to theology but a way back to a natural morality that, on principle, can do 
without theology. There is a second way she proposes at the meantime – which 
 
36 G.E.M. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (London: Hutchinson, 
1959) 11-12, 169. 
37 Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
38 Ibid., p. 171. 
39 P. Geach, Review of Colombo’s translation of the Tractatus, The Philosophical Review, 
66/4 (1957) 556-559, p. 558. 
40 Ibid. 
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I would call her semi-official moral ontology – and this is theism with a divine 
law-giver. Occasional rather infelicitous expressions that have been duly used 
by critics for attacking her as one more proponent of a divine-command 
morality or of extreme voluntarism. It is fair to remark that, taking it at its 
best, the contents of such divine-law ethics overlap completely with those of 
what would be a sound secular morality, that is, one dispensing with the 
emphatic ought and focusing instead on the norm as a model, needs, virtues 
and inbuilt rules of language games. And yet, even such semi-official moral 
ontology based on a divine law-giver is both irremediably flawed and 
unnecessary in any philosophical discussion of morality.  
4. ANSCOMBE ON THE EMPTY MORAL OUGHT 
Anscombe admits that Hume did point out some interesting characteristics 
in the is-ought connection thus doing “a considerable service by showing that 
no content could be found in the notion ‘morally ought’”41. Rules in themselves 
are fully comprehensible within the context of practices and institutions, but 
this does not mean that they carry the force of moral obligation.  
What is not a real philosophical problem is the transition from is to ought. 
The term ought could be a totally harmless term when used within one 
language game and we would learn how to use it by entering the language 
game itself. But its necessity in, say, the promising game, depends on 
considerations of a different kind. She writes:  
What is this necessity? The answer is given only by describing the procedure, 
the language-game, which as far as concerns the ‘necessity’ expressed in it does 
not differ from this one: I say ping and have to say pong […] There is clearly no 
answer to ‘Why do I have to?’ […] But if the procedure has the role of an 
instrument in people’s attainment of so many of the goods of common life, the 
necessity that people should both actually adopt the procedure, i.e. often give 
undertakings; and also go along with the procedure, i.e. tend to accept the 
necessity expressed in that reaction and treat it as a rule – this necessity is a 
necessity of a quite different sort: it is the necessity that Aristotle spoke of, by 
which something is called necessary if without it good cannot be attained42. 
In the light of this example we are expected to be able to ‘see’ a viable sense 
of the notion of ‘duty’ and cognate modals (‘should’, ‘you’d better’, ‘obligation’, 
‘must’ etc.) as opposed to the law or command sense inadvertently preserved in 
 
41 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, p. 179. 
42 G.E.M. Anscombe, “On Promising and its Justice” (1969) in Ethics, Religion and Politics 
10-21, p. 19.  
62        SERGIO CREMASCHI 
 
the received meaning (or better ‘force’) of these modals, those that Diamond 
proposes to call ‘Kantian modals’43. Anscombe’s alternative is based instead on 
‘Aristotelian modals’, namely expressions that may be lexically identical but 
carry a different meaning or force. 
In thinking of the word for ‘should’, ‘ought’ etc. (δεῖ) as it occurs in 
Aristotle, we should think of it as it occurs in ordinary language (e.g. as it 
has occurred in this sentence) and not just as it occurs in the examples of 
‘moral discourse’ given by moral philosophers [...] any fair selection of 
examples, if we care to summon them up, should convince us that 'should' 
is a rather light word with unlimited contexts of application, and it can be 
presumed that it is because of this feature that Aristotle chose a roughly 
corresponding Greek word as the word to put into the universal premise 
of his schematic practical syllogism44. 
Let us take now a closer look at the argument. Anscombe asks whether 
there is any possibility to keep a law conception without a divine law-giver, and 
she carries out a cursory overview of attempts to this effect. The first she 
considers is the idea of legislating for oneself, which she assumes to be a fairly 
bizarre Kantian innovation. She assumes, indeed without argument, that “you 
cannot be under a law unless it has been promulgate to you”, and adds that 
the ideas that legislation can be “for oneself” is “absurd”, for whatever you do 
for yourself cannot be “legislating”; indeed, it would mean “to have to frame 
one’s own rules and to go by them, and if one is lucky it will lead to good”, but 
whether ‘this leads to good or evil will depend on the content of the rules’ 45. 
The objection is in order here that she seems to miss the circumstance that 
‘self-legislation’ is an obvious enough transfer to ethics of a key-idea from 
Rousseau’s political theory and also is an expression of the familiar idea – let 
us think of later Stoicism, Aquinas and Maimonides – that human reason is 
the source of both contents and authority of the moral law. Besides, her own 
image of self-legislation looks more like Hare’s prescriptivism46 than Kantian 
ethics. To say the least, the latter implies a somewhat richer picture, where the 
moral subjects are members of a constitutional kingdom, the ill-famed 
Kingdom of Ends, and thus at once subjects and legislators47. Let me add that 
 
43 C. Diamond, “The Dog that Gave Himself the Moral Law”, Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 13/1 (1988) 161-179, pp. 169-171.  
44 G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention, p. 64. 
45 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, p. 186. 
46 R.M. Hare, The Language and Morals (1952) (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999). 
47 I. Kant, Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten (1785) in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, 
ed. by the Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Meiner - de 
Gruyter, 1902-) vol. IV: 385-463, p. 433. 
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the distinct meaning of legislating for oneself should turn out much clearer 
now, a few decades after the revival of Kantian scholarship which Anscombe 
did not live long enough to take into account. In short, Kantian self-legislation 
may fairly enough be construed in terms of deliberating about action while 
taking on oneself the burden of implicit constraints we have built at the very 
time we engaged in any kind of social practice. This is, amazingly enough, the 
same point Anscombe herself makes more than once when talking of language 
games and rules. Let me add that such constraints rest on a ground not 
altogether different from those of Paul Grice’s logic of conversation making 
rules arise ‘spontaneously’ from the practice itself48. Note that the latter Grice 
was one more Oxford philosopher, coming from a tradition of linguistic 
philosophy not too far from the second Wittgenstein, and this may suggest that 
Anscombe could have easily found an antidote to Oxford philosophy within 
Oxford philosophy itself. Just a few years after 1958 – apparently without any 
awareness by Anscombe – John Searle took precisely this step49. Besides, a non-
consequentialist view of justice and benevolence – Kant’s two basic 
imperatives – has been worked out by Kant himself in the universally 
neglected Metaphysics of Morality50, and similar views have been advanced in 
the last decades by Apel, Habermas, Donagan and O’Neill without falling 
back into mysterious ought.  
A second source she discusses is the contractual origin of morality. She 
discards it on the basis of an actual contract condition, declaring it 
meaningless unless the contract is an historical event51.  
A third possible source she takes more seriously is quasi-contractual source 
based on our use of language as a sign of “entering into various contracts”52. 
Her first objection is that it has never been worked out and its results, if any, 
would be rather formal. An interesting coincidence is that a paper by Clarence 
Lewis, published the same year as “Modern Moral Philosophy”, first proposed 
the idea of ‘pragmatic contradiction’ as a source of constraints in moral 
judgements. This was ten years before Karl-Otto Apel launched his own theory 
where contents of moral judgments are derived from a need to avoid the 
“performative contradiction”, a theory that could allegedly reach “such 
 
48 H. P. Grice Studies in the Ways of Words (Cambridge, MASS: Harvard University Press, 
1989) 22-40. 
49 J. Searle, “How to derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’” (1964) in Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969) 175-198. 
50 I. Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten (1797) in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, vol. VI: 203-493, p. 
385. 
51 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, p. 186. 
52 Ibid., p. 186. 
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particularities as the prohibition of murder”53. The second objection is that 
ignorance of your entering into a contract is usually held to be destructive of 
the nature of a contract. To this, one could object in turn that there are 
different kinds of ignorance, and ignorance due to fault, or ignorantia crassa et 
supine, is seldom held – and notably it is not by Aquinas – to be destructive of 
our duty. Theories have been formulated according to which one is not 
justified in claiming that, while making promises and performing other kinds 
of speech act, he had not been informed of the circumstance that, by so doing, 
he was accepting the burden of several commitments. Let me mention, besides 
Apel’s and Searle’s discussion, Price, Kant and Whewell54.  
A fourth possibility discussed is that of norms found in human virtues: let 
us assume that the species homo sapiens has such and such virtues, and that a 
member of the species with the complete set of virtues is the “norm”, not 
unlike “a complete set of teeth is a norm”55, and for humans not only a given 
number of teeth but also a number of capacities in various fields such as 
communication, emotions, and judgement is a norm. The problem with this 
view would be that norm, thus understood, would lose the proper meaning of 
norm as a law. This, she believes, is not too bad, but the problem is that such 
an idea of norm cannot be used in order to express the idea of law without 
bringing God in, and this would imply that the notion of ‘duty’ should 
disappear.  
Before discussing this shift, that is indeed the crucial one, let me mention a 
fifth possibility that she dismisses en passant, that is, the laws of nature as a 
source for the moral law. The expression used here, ‘laws of nature’, is different 
enough from the various phrasings she adopts alternatively as a name for the 
alternative she endorses, namely natural moral law, divine law, natural divine 
law. In her intentions, this should mark the distance she sees between the two 
possibilities. Her objection against the ‘laws of nature’ is that this solution is 
likely “to lead one to eat the weaker according to the laws of nature, but would 
hardly lead anyone nowadays to the notions of justice”56. Thus described, laws 
of nature look much like the Sophists’ and Hobbes’s state of nature. It is 
surprising that Aquinas fails to be discussed in this connection in order to 
 
53 K.-O. Apel, “Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft und die Grudlagen der Ethik” 
(1969) in Transformation der Philosophie, 2 vols. (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1973) 220-263. 
54 R. Price, Review of the Principal Questions of Morals (1758) ed. by D.D. Raphael (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1974) ch. 7; I. Kant, Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten (1785) in Kant's 
gesammelte Schriften, vol. IV: 402-40 and 429-30; W. Whewell, Elements Of Morality Including 
Polity, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Parker, 1865, 3d ed.) ch. 15.  
55 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, p. 188. 
56 Ibid., p. 187. 
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make it clear that his view of the ‘natural law’ has little to share with such state-
of-nature doctrines.  
A sixth possibility is not discussed at all. It is the Stoic view of laws of nature 
as embodiment of a rational world-order, or of the Logos with which the world 
as a whole is infused. Note that this idea is basically the same as the one 
Augustine found in Plotinus and named lex aeterna. It is the standard phrase 
adopted then by Aquinas (indeed, as an alternative to the phrase divine law 
which he employs on a handful occasions) as a name for his own idea of 
natural law when viewed from the Creator’s point of view, as a kind of 
objective rational world-order that turns into or, better, yields a prescriptive 
law once it is “proposed” to his rational creatures. Curiously enough, 
Anscombe is careful in avoiding mention of “natural law” without further 
qualification, constantly adding the further adjective “divine”, and she seldom 
mentions “eternal law”, while showing a preference for the expression “divine 
law”, in turn seldom used by Aquinas. This has egregiously contributed to 
making misinterpretations widespread but – once misinterpretations have 
been duly refuted - it may also be a clue to some deeper tension in Anscombe’s 
own solution. I will come back to this point in what follows. For the time being, 
the remark is in order that Anscombe surprisingly classifies Stoic philosophy 
as a whole as belonging to the wider group of “divine law” theories, comparing 
the Stoics to Jews and Christians, thus making a somewhat unpalatable 
sandwich with two religious faiths with one philosophical school as a filling. 
The serious trouble with such treatment of Stoicism is, first, that historically 
given Stoicism was, in its first phase, a strong philosophical monotheism 
combined with an “ethic” deriving from metaphysical necessitarianism the 
prescription to follow one’s fate, thus yielding a highly paradoxical kind of 
immoralism; secondly, that later Stoicism, after Panetius, became less assertive 
in its metaphysics and accordingly in its philosophical monotheism, and more 
substantive in its ethics, leaving wide room for καθέκον or officium (something 
less than το δέον) and thus legitimizing – beyond the ancient school’s self-
regarding virtue of ataraxìa – other-regarding virtues as are recommended by 
Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. The correlation between 
ethics and Theism in the latter authors seems to be looser than the one found 
in Aquinas. To be more precise, it seems to be absent in Cicero, faint in 
Seneca, explicit in Epictetus and remarkably strong in Marcus Aurelius, but 
playing a role more similar to the one it plays in Moses Mendelsohn and 
Immanuel Kant than in Aquinas, that is, introduced after the ethical doctrine 
qua self-standing doctrine, as an additional confirmation that there is in the 
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world an overarching Providence further confirming our confident adhesion to 
necessity57.  
 
 
 
5. ARISTOTELIAN MODALS IN PLACE OF THE EMPTY OUGHT 
Anscombe’s considerations on the cross-breeding between two different sets 
of ideas, namely the Aristotelian virtue theory and the allegedly Stoic, Hebrew 
and Christian divine-law doctrine, and the survival of the resulting hybrid, the 
emphatic ‘ought’ obtaining its mysterious force by oblivion of origins, are 
obviously dependent on Schopenhauer filtered through Wittgenstein’s 
teaching. But what was the point Anscombe wanted to make by repeating such 
a diagnosis? In other words, what was, if any, the way out of the muddle she 
had in mind?  
One answer could be that divine-law ethics, understood as divine-command 
theory or extreme voluntarism is Anscombe’s own ethics58. As illustrated 
above, Wittgenstein’s views were rather close to such a view. He was a deeply 
religious mind, and he had declared that if he had had an ethic this would 
have the same as a religion and that ‘seeing things’ from an ethical point of 
view is taking a point of view on the world that gives it a meaning. The point 
on which he disagreed with a few among his followers who were Roman 
Catholics was that he felt he could not believe all the things they did believe, 
or that his religion was a religion without positive doctrines. 
Another current interpretation of her views is that she marked two parallel 
paths, namely divine law for Theists and, for those unwilling to follow her, 
“Aristotelianism without divine law”59. But, on this interpretation, her overall 
view would be rather unstable and raise more troubles than it settles: why 
should we need divine law unless for revealing us additional precepts 
inaccessible to human beings in the state of Pure Nature, without the aid of 
Grace? The latter was an option widely shared in Scholastic theology, but is 
also one that Anscombe explicitly rejects. She declares not only that her task is 
 
57 S. Cremaschi, Tradizioni morali. Greci, ebrei, cristiani, islamici (Rome: Edizioni di 
Letteratura e Storia, 2015) 76-82 and 93-128.  
58 S. Blackburn, ‘‘Simply Wrong’’, Times Literary Supplement, 30 September 2005.  
59 R. Crisp, “Does Modern Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, p. 86; O. O’Neill, 
“Modern Moral Philosophy and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions”, in A. O’Hear (ed.) 
Modern Moral Philosophy, 301-316, p.304; Th. Pink, “Moral Obligation”, ibid.: 159-186. 
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a purely philosophical, not a theological one, but also that the positive contents 
of the Christian Gospel do not add other precepts to those taught by natural 
reason or that the “content of the moral law, i.e. the actions which are good or 
just, is not essentially a matter of revelation”60. Note that this is tantamount to 
endorsing a venerable claim, the one expressed by Grotius in his famous and 
misinterpreted dictum ‘etsi daremus Deum non esse’ and before him, by 
Caietanus in his formulation of the idea of pura natura as a state in which 
humans are capable of morality without knowing the true religion, and in 
Aquinas in his definition of the moral law as a dictate of sound reason that 
recognizes true human goods and prescribes to pursue them.  
A third interpretation would be that divine-law theory is not Anscombe’s 
view and, since the content of the moral law is not a matter of revelation and 
knowledge of good and evil is accessible to everybody, duties would have the 
nature of hypothetical imperatives. This is the option explicitly defended by 
Foot, in a first phase arguing that Kant had been unable to conceive of 
morality without a categorical imperative because he was a psychological 
hedonist and, once Kant’s psychology and action theory are dropped, it may 
appear to be obvious that a moral agent just follows hypothetical imperatives. 
Such an agent desires his/her neighbour’s good and “may care about the 
suffering of others, having a sense of identification with them, and wanting to 
help if he can”61. This holds not just for charity but also for such virtues as 
honesty, in so far as he/she would “follow honesty for the sake of the good that 
honest dealing brings to men”62. In a second phase, yet, Foot revised her view 
of practical rationality. She admitted she had been wrong in adopting a 
Humean view of rationality as tool for guiding action based on desires and 
prudence while taking it for granted that reasons derive from the agent’s 
desires63 and declared her adhesion to an Aristotelian view of rationality, where 
considerations different from desires and prudential considerations, first of all 
moral considerations, are no more important than desires and prudential 
considerations, and admitted that “acting morally is part of practical 
rationality”64. A good functioning of practical rationality may be defined 
 
60 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Authority in Morals” (1962) in Ethics, Religion and Politics, 43-49, p. 
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starting with the fact that we are living beings endowed with a set of desires 
and emotions, with some given kind of anatomy and neurological organization 
but also with a set of social needs. Thus, practical rationality is no special kind 
of reason, neither because of some special syntactic or semantic characteristic 
nor because of its connection with sentiments of mental attitudes. It is simply 
reason when connected with will. There are indeed practical considerations 
not specifically moral in their nature, but it is because of a mistaken doctrine, 
namely psychological egoism, that the tendency has prevailed to think that 
rationality of action corresponds to some benefit it may bring to the agent 
himself, but there is no reason to rule out collective benefit as a goal for action. 
Hence the pseudo-problem of a conflict between moral and prudential reasons 
arose as well as the unnecessary rigorism of moral philosophical talk as well as 
the special meaning ascribed to ‘ought’, which is ultimately not so far in 
meaning from ‘should’ as used in many directions and recommendations 
having a practical character and a weak moral character or no moral character 
at all65.  
The main trouble is, according to Anscombe, that the emphatic use of 
‘ought’ allows for formulating such questions as whether, under given 
circumstances, one ought to commit injustice. There are cases, as judicial 
punishment of an innocent, where “there can be absolutely no argument about 
the description of this as unjust. No circumstances, and no expected 
consequences, which do not modify the description of the procedure as one of 
judicially punishing a man for what he is known not to have done can modify 
the description of it as unjust”66. What is out of order in modern moral 
philosophy, at least after Sidgwick, is that it has become possible to discuss 
whether such a thing be “morally right”. Instead, it is clear enough that one 
could not even start a discussion about its being “just”, because such an act is a 
paradigmatic unjust act. Note that here too Anscombe takes a typically 
Wittgensteinian move, namely dissolving philosophical problems instead of 
settling them; in other words, one has to prove not that the consequentialist 
defence of the repugnant consequence, or the principle of Chaifa, is wicked, 
which is no business for philosophers, but that it could not even be formulated 
unless because of an undetected disease of language. On the other hand, 
Anscombe admits that the term ought carries no deep philosophical mystery 
as the non-cognitivists would make us believe, even though Hume did point 
out some interesting characteristics in the is-ought connection and has done “a 
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considerable service by showing that no content could be found in the notion 
‘morally ought’”67.  
The problem with Hume is that he was mixing up different issues. One was 
the half-aware discovery of a relative character of “brute” facts, where 
something is a fact in relationship to some further level which may be a “fact” 
in relationship to a still further one68. Another issue, which Hume missed, was 
the relationship between ought and needs. In Intention she remarks that, when 
somebody aims at health or pleasure, then the enquiry “What’s the good of it?” 
is not a sensible one. As for reasons against a man making one of them his 
principal aim; and whether there are orders of human goods, e.g., whether 
some are greater than others, and whether if this is so a man need ever prefer 
the greater to the less, and on pain of what; this question would belong to 
Ethics, if there is such a science69. Her point is that in cases different from 
human beings, say the case of a plant, the inference from is to needs is 
certainly not in the least dubious, and the difference for human beings is that 
there is  
some sort of necessary connection between what you think you need, and what 
you want. The connection is a complicated one; it is possible not to want 
something that you judge you need. This however, is not a fact about the 
meaning of the word “to need”, but about the phenomenon of wanting70.  
What is not a genuine philosophical problem is the transition from is to 
ought. The latter could be a totally harmless term when used within one 
language game and we would learn how to use it by entering the language 
game itself:  
What is this necessity? The answer is given only by describing the procedure, 
the language-game, which as far as concerns the “necessity” expressed in it does 
not differ from this one: I say ping and have to say pong […] There is clearly no 
answer to “Why do I have to?”[…] But if the procedure has the role of an 
instrument in people’s attainment of so many of the goods of common life, the 
necessity that people should both actually adopt the procedure, i.e. often give 
undertakings; and also go along with the procedure, i.e., tend to accept the 
necessity expressed in that reaction and treat it as a rule – this necessity is a 
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necessity of a quite different sort: it is the necessity that Aristotle spoke of, by 
which something is called necessary if without it good cannot be attained71. 
And elsewhere she adds: 
how on earth can it be the meaning of a sign that by giving it one purports to 
create a necessity of doing something – a necessity whose source is the sign itself, 
and whose nature depends on the sign […] Not only promises, but also rules and 
rights, are essences created and not merely captured or expressed by the 
grammar of our languages […] 
These musts and cant’s are the most basic expression of such-and-such’s being a 
rule; just as they are the most basic expression in learning the rules of a game, 
and as they are too in being taught rights and manners. But they aren’t, in 
Hume’s phrase, naturally intelligible72.  
But the point is that there is no legitimate “emphatic” or “moral” use of the 
term. As its use should either be legitimised by divine law or not be legitimised 
by a view of human norm as endowment with such and such virtues. But, on 
the one hand it is true that “it remains impossible to infer ‘morally ought’ from 
‘is’”73, and yet this is just one instance of the more general circumstance that 
ought “cannot be inferred from anything whatever”, which implies that it is 
not true that “it could be inferred from other “morally ought” sentences”74 if 
inference has to possess a non-trivial meaning. In other words, Hare’s 
prescriptivism is right at a formal level, that is, when it contends that from a 
general premise including an ought-predicate some conclusion containing an 
ought-predicate may be derived. But this is both perfectly true and trivial, 
since, in order to have a “real” implication, in order not to be left with “a word 
containing no intelligible thought”75, you need to substitute your ought with 
some real predicate.  
Let us consider the promises language-game. Such a procedure is an 
instrument for a great deal of human activity. One could hardly live in a 
society without stumbling upon it. Now, what kind of necessity does such a 
procedure carry?  
As shown in the above example of the language-game, it is the necessity in 
order to attain a good; this is the legitimate Aristotelian sense of necessity, as 
opposed to the unjustified ‘Kantian’ notion of duty. The word δεῖ in Aristotle 
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carries the same meaning as should or equivalent words in ordinary language 
“and not as it occurs in the examples of ‘moral discourse’ given by moral 
philosophers”76. Thus, Anscombe’s view may be assumed to be different from 
Foot’s first view. The non-legalistic imperatives of which morality of an 
Aristotelian kind consists, may be thought to be different from hypothetical 
ones. The reason for their binding character – a special one, different from the 
“Kantian” absolute character of the categorical imperative, might be found in 
the existence of language games and practices (such as promises) that produce 
a series of “human assets” or human goods. There is nothing mysterious or 
metaphysical behind duty or the moral law, except obvious facts such as that 
we are finite and vulnerable beings living together with other fellow-beings. It 
is rather obvious that we need cooperation in order to survive and live our 
lives at their best (with no moral specific meaning implied by the word). 
Anscombe’s answer is thus that Aristotelian necessity carries directions or 
prescriptions not to be understood in a legalistic sense and yet binding 
unconditionally and without exceptions. The reason is that, first, the fact that 
there are specific needs determined to be such by our own nature makes 
Aristotelian modals binding, i.e., it is necessary for us to obey such directions 
or prescriptions in so far as this brings about our nature’s specific good, and 
secondly, the existence of language games such as promises that could subsist 
only on the basis of Aristotelian modals is required in view of the production 
of a wide range of “human goods”77. This may be a fair way to settle the 
discussion about what Anscombe was actually recommending, either virtue 
ethics or a law view of ethics.  
6. HOW DIVINE IS DIVINE NATURAL LAW? 
Teichmann aptly comments that many of those aspects of Anscombe’s 
ethics which have aroused strong reactions are more apparent in contributions 
to normative and applied ethics where she addresses a Catholic audience, 
albeit in what purports to be a purely philosophical perspective, for she 
“believed, like Aquinas, that church teaching about ethical matters could be 
rationally argued for”,78 and that  
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the ‘Catholic’ aspect of Anscombe’s moral philosophy is one that is really not 
so evident in the more meta-ethical pieces. If we were to mention influences at 
all there, then we would probably have to cite […] Aristotle for the direction of 
his thought, Wittgenstein for his philosophical method, and Hume for his ability 
to raise important and hitherto unnoticed questions79.  
And yet, besides other sources of puzzlement in purely meta-ethical topics, 
the notion of divine law has been quite bewildering for commentators. O’Brien 
remarks that  
hasty readers of ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ have seen in Anscombe’s remarks 
about moral obligation a kind of crude voluntarism, in which law’s obliging 
force amount to a mere order backed by a threat, after the fashion of Austinite 
legal positivism. This reading is mistaken […] Indeed, the substance of her 
discussions of law and obligation closely tracks the natural law theism of 
Aquinas80.  
In fact, her intention was clearly enough to rescue Aquinas’s view of the 
moral law, based on the twin concepts of eternal law and natural law. Yet, a 
careful reader cannot fail to notice a constant oscillation in her use of 
terminology, deriving partly from a concern to keep the distinction clear 
between positive and natural law (a distinction applying also to divine law, 
which may be itself positive and natural), and partly ascribable perhaps to 
terminological preferences in the literature through which she was introduced 
to Thomism, and partly dictated by a rhetorical strategy inspired by her 
polemical strategy against “modern” moral philosophy. This preoccupation 
may explain passages where she occasionally becomes less clear and bends 
textual evidence to fit her overall conjecture, namely the Schopenhauerian and 
Wittgensteinian story about the forgotten Biblical and Christian origins of the 
notion of duty. One might perhaps classify these passages under the label 
“semi-official moral ontology” and argue that the “official” view, besides 
raising serious problems as to the nature and scope of divine law, is 
incompatible with the Schopenhauerian story, that is, with Anscombe’s third 
thesis as a whole81.  
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himself and those around him” (The Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe, pp. 104-105). 
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It is well-known how the idea of natural law carries out a decisive function 
for Aquinas but the latter might be profitably analysed in more detail. Aquinas 
in Summa Theologiae designates by the term lex aeterna, taken from 
Augustine, a rational world order or the plan of divine providence. When he 
mentions lex naturalis he means a kind of “participation” in the eternal law, or 
the eternal law itself when considered as “proposed” to God’s rational 
creatures. In the Summa contra Gentes – an earlier work – such order, 
considered in the same way, is named lex divina82. The latter expression has a 
limited number of occurrences also in Summa Theologiae, albeit it shows up 
just twice in the Prima Secundae, as a way of introducing the idea of a natural 
law as distinguished from positive (either divine and human) law and, after 
that, going on talking just of natural and positive law83. A few more 
occurrences are in the less theoretically challenging Secunda Secundae but the 
phrase lex divina (or occasionally jus divinum) is either equivalent to positive 
divine law as contrasted with natural divine law or, less often, with lex 
aeterna84.  
Note that, even though the Summa Theologiae addresses a Christian 
audience, yet in various parts of Prima Secundae Aquinas proceeds on the 
basis of argument from reason, i.e., purely philosophical ones, and the thrust 
of the argument points not at the divine character of the moral law but, vice 
versa, at the extensional equivalence between dictates of sound reason and 
precepts of the natural law, exception being made for positive divine law. That 
is, albeit addressing, unlike Anscombe, a Christian, not a secularized 
audience, his overall argument points at the conclusion that natural law may 
be totally translated into dictates of sound reason or of practical wisdom, 
which do have prescriptive force but do not need to be formulated as laws, and 
thus the law-view of ethics, far from being the peculiar trait of an imaginary 
Christian-Hebrew-Stoic ethics, is just one among various ways in which the 
demands of virtue may be construed85. 
 
82 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, book III, chs. 115, 119, 121,128, 129; note that 
in this work Aquinas is addressing an audience such as the Muslims who were not assumed to 
accept the Christian Revelation but were assumed to be fully convinced of the existence of God 
and his character of legislator. 
83 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia-IIae q. 91, a. 1, ad 1, ad 3; a. 4, ob. 1, ad 1; q. 93 
art. 5, resp. 
84 Ibid., IIa-IIae, q. 57, a. 2, ad 3; q. 109, a. 2, ad 3; q. 124, a. 5, ad 2; q. 141, a. 2, ad 1; for 
comments cf J. Finnis, Aquinas. Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998) 308-309.  
85 S. Cremaschi, Tradizioni morali, pp. 320-322. 
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In “The Justice of the Present War Examined” of 1939, Anscombe starts 
with a complaint about the loss of the “idea of natural moral law” among 
“modern men”, adding that  
without it they cannot live in peace within themselves, or socially or 
internationally. For the natural law is the law of man’s own nature, showing how 
he must choose to act in matters where his will is free, if his nature is to be 
properly fulfilled […] 
To those who believe in God it will rightly appear that His law, the eternal 
law, has its reflection in the ordered activity of Creation, that ‘law of nature’ 
which is the truth of things. In man, this activity is not wholly determined, but 
here is an element of choice. Thus far, “to him the law is proposed; it is not 
imposed upon him”. But it is no less law for that; it binds because it is the law 
of his nature. And in what it consists he can discover by reason, checked and 
guaranteed by divine revelation of Scripture86.  
On this basis, one may safely argue that she had it already clear in mind 
that moral truths are within the reach of human knowledge, for the natural law 
is the law of man’s own nature and thus such truths are the same for all, 
atheists, agnostics and devout believers; besides, that the latter may have good 
reasons to see the world order as a divine order, an order which is reflected in 
the Creation; and also that believers may recognize in the moral teaching of 
the Hebrew-Christian tradition a confirmation of those they have already been 
able to detect as the law of (wo)man’s own nature. Mary Geach Gormally 
correctly remarked that  
Anscombe maintains that the class of actions which are illicit (i.e., contrary to 
divine law) is the same class as the class of actions which are contrary to the 
virtues which one has to have in order to be a good human being. She did not 
think one needed a divine law conception of ethics to know what a good human 
being was, or what virtues he had87. 
In Modern Moral Philosophy the same concept is mentioned again more 
than once. Differences in argumentative strategy with the 1939 paper stem, 
first, from the presence of the notion of virtue on a par with that of law; 
secondly, from introduction of the distinction between natural divine law and 
positive divine law; thirdly from an oscillation in terminology that makes so 
that the natural law is called most of the time divine law.  
 
86 G.E.M. Anscombe, “The justice of the present war examined”, in Ethics, Religion and 
Politics, 72-81, pp. 72-73. 
87 M. Geach, “Letter to the Editor”, Times Literary Supplement, Oct 7 2005. 
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With regard to the third point, “positive divine law” occurs only once88, 
while “natural divine law” occurs twice89. Both expressions are clearly taken 
from Aquinas, for whom they designate, the first the particular prescriptions 
given by God to the chosen people and later on to the Christian Church, such 
as the duty to worship on Saturday or Sunday, to fast on Yom Kippur or Good 
Friday and so on, mainly with a cultic character, and the second the whole of 
moral law, which is divine in its nature in so far as, after Creation (or, as 
William of Ockham more plausibly suggested later on, at the very moment of 
Creation and as an inseparable part of the act of Creation) he promulgated the 
moral law, which had already been written in the divine Logos as reflected in 
the world order and proposed to humankind through the latter’s ability to 
detect the inner law of its own nature.  
Three years after “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Anscombe insists that those 
specific precepts which human reason is able to discover are confirmed later 
on by divine revelation. The latter, yet, may add to motives but not to the 
specific contents of such Aristotelian modals, for “the motives, spirit, meaning 
and purpose” of the moral life of Christians depend on revelation, and yet one 
should keep in mind  
both that the law of love had already been taught in the Old Testament and 
that the content of the moral law, i.e. the actions which are good and just, is not 
essentially a matter of revelation […] what there does not seem to be room for is 
moral truths which are per se revealed90.  
The report of discussion following the paper’s presentation informs us that  
It was objected that the ‘new law’ of Christ was indeed a revelation in the 
domain of morality. The speaker admitted this in the sense that the motives, 
spirit, meaning and purpose of the moral life of Christians depended on 
revelation, while insisting both that the law of love had already been taught in 
the Old Testament and that the content of the moral law, i.e., the actions which 
are good and just, is not essentially a matter of revelation91.  
Things become tricky as we approach what has been called the problem of 
promulgation92. Clearly enough, even though Aristotle cannot be depicted as 
 
88 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, p. 177 fn 2. 
89 Ibid., p. 177 fn 2 and 187. 
90 G.E.M Anscombe, “Authority in morals” (1962) in Ethics, Religion and Politics, 43-50, p. 
50. 
91 Cf. the discussion’s report after the same paper, Ibid., p. 50; cf. R. Teichmann, The 
Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe, pp. 107-8.  
92 C. Vogler, “Modern Moral Philosophy Again: Isolating the Promulgation Problem”, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 106 (2006) 347-364. 
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defending a position opposed to natural law theories, Aristotelian necessity 
does not require a legislator and apparently does not need the notion of law93. 
On the contrary, the idea of a divine law, including both positive and natural 
law, with the implied assumption of a divine law-giver, plays an important role 
in Aquinas’s system of ideas. I would add that this is true of such system as a 
whole but, once we shift to Aquinas’s philosophical ethics as such – assuming 
that it can indeed be reconstructed isolating it from his theological doctrines – 
natural law may stand on its own feet, supported by the dictates of sound 
human reason. The fact that dictates of human reason converge with those of 
natural law is of the greatest import for the system but might be safely ignored 
by the righteous human being who has not been blessed by the gift of 
knowledge of divine revelation. This – I would add – is precisely a point 
William of Ockham makes in a more explicit way than Aquinas when talking 
of the “philosopher’s virtue” as distinguished from the “Christian’s virtue”94.  
Anscombe repeatedly insists that the divine law-giver is required, albeit in 
different ways, both by positive divine law, i.e., those which she calls “the 
ramified prescriptions of the Torah” 95, and by “the requirements of ‘natural 
divine law”96. She illustrates this by her cryptic example of the Stoics compared 
to Jews and Christians. She writes:  
one might be inclined to think that a law conception of ethics could arise only 
among people who accepted an allegedly divine positive law; that this is not so is 
shown by the example of the Stoics, who also thought that whatever was involved 
in conformity to human virtues was required by divine law97. 
The objection might be raised that this passage raises more questions than 
it answers, in so far as the notion of a Creator God is missing in the Stoic 
philosophy in all of its versions, and thus for the Stoics the very notion of 
promulgation would have looked like a rather obscure one. For them, the 
divine Logos was present in the world by a kind of participation, neither by 
divine decree nor by an act of creation, and the human mind was in a position 
to discover it within itself in so far as it was a meros, a part, of a universe 
imbued with divine reason. Thus, the Stoic view at its best could lead, rather 
than to a divine law promulgated by a law-giver God, to a view of the moral 
 
93 C. Vogler, “Aristotle, Aquinas, Anscombe and the New Virtue Ethics”, in T. Hoffmann, J. 
Müller, M. Perkams (eds.) Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), pp. 239-257. 
94 S. Cremaschi, Tradizioni morali, pp. 313-319 and 344-317. 
95 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, p. 177 fn 2. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid., p. 175 
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law as autonomously dictated by human reason, that is, to a view Anscombe 
disliked because of her own anti-Kantian prejudice. 
One among other bewildering elements in the language of “Modern Moral 
Philosophy” is the adoption of the phrase “divine law” instead of the standard 
“natural law”. This is, as mentioned, a term used by Aquinas but not the one 
adopted in the standard systematic presentation of his ethics, i.e., the Prima 
Secundae. Another is the expression “law conception of ethics”, apparently 
one of Anscombe’s neologisms whose precise meaning is, yet, far from obvious 
but whose function in her argument is but too clear, namely stressing an 
alleged incompatibility between modern ethics, unavowed and confused 
theology-without-God, and Medieval ethics, a masterly synthesis of Reason 
and Revelation.  
Let me come now to the decisive point. What has gone wrong with 
Anscombe’s Aristotelian moral realism contrasted with delusory modern, so to 
say “non-naturalist”, hypostatization of the moral ought? I would suggest that 
by the above remark concerning the Stoics and divine natural law she commits 
both a Freudian lapsus betraying her polemical intentions and a logical fallacy. 
The passage before the quoted remark reads: 
How did this come about? The answer is in history: between Aristotle and us 
came Christianity, with its law conception of ethics. For Christianity derived its 
ethical conception from the Torah98. 
This fits well enough the Schopenhauerian story that Anscombe 
incorporated in her own third thesis, but, if history is as important for 
theoretical arguments as she seems to believe, it should be at least carried out 
on academic standards. Now, the word Torah in Hebrew does not mean law 
but rather instruction and was first translated into Greek as Nomos, which in 
turn means both law and a handful other things. As a proof that Christianity 
has a “law conception” of ethics, the above half-line is thus a scant proof. 
Besides, the original Christian preaching had little to share with philosophical 
conceptions of any kind and its targets were of a different kind, while later 
reformulations using Platonic, Stoic and middle-Academic concepts were 
probably acceptable and even useful undertakings, but they could hardly claim 
the title of Divine Revelation. The following remark about the Stoics – its 
legitimate preoccupation notwithstanding to clarify that natural law is not 
tantamount to positive divine law – is no more than friendly fire shot on her 
own thesis, firstly because the Stoic view of Logos is incompatible with the 
 
98 Ibid., p. 175. 
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idea of a promulgated law, and secondly, because the Stoics were not “people”, 
like Jews and Christians, but just one philosophical school among others.  
 
 
 
7. AND HOW ARISTOTELIAN IS ARISTOTELIAN NECESSITY?  
Anscombe is commonly, and plausibly enough, classified as the founding 
‘father’ of one current, neo-naturalism, including Geach, Foot, Murdoch, 
MacIntyre, and perhaps Hursthouse. This is not too bad – at least more 
plausible than classifying her as the founder of virtue ethics – for naturalism is 
a kind of anti-non-naturalism consisting in a double negation, namely refusal 
of Moore’s argument against the naturalistic fallacy. But such classification 
would be utterly false if the choice of the term was meant to suggest the 
slightest similarity with what is understood most of the time for ethical 
naturalism, namely the kind of theories defended by Peter Railton, Robert 
Boyd and David Brink99.  
Oddly enough, one of the claims in “Modern Moral Philosophy” is that 
non-naturalist moral realism, an ontological claim about the existence of 
special entities such as those designated by the words ‘duty’ and ‘ought’ – as 
opposed to those indicated by ordinary use of the words ought, should etc. – is 
utterly mistaken. In other words, that the claim according to which some 
entities are “moral facts” with a different character from that of everyday-life 
facts is a mistake. This is assumed by her to be a claim explicitly advanced by 
Kant, Moore and Ross, but also one of the basic unspoken assumptions of 
“modern” ethics. The argument provided in order to support the claim is a 
typically Wittgensteinian one. The philosopher’s task is assumed to consist not 
in proving by argument, but just in showing something by recalling what has 
been forgotten, thus healing some pathology of language. It is a negative task, 
consisting in reminding the audience that some words, which have been 
mistaken for things, are just words. The basic assumption for the rejection of 
moral realism is Wittgenstein’s argument about family resemblances, namely 
that there is no essence necessarily laying at the root of series of terms each of 
them connected by some resemblance with the previous and the following one. 
 
99 S. Cremaschi, “Naturalizzazione senza naturalismo: una prospettiva per la metaetica”, 
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, 9/2 (2007) 201-217, retrievable at 
http://www2.units.it/~etica/2007_2/CREMASCHI.pdf.  
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And yet, her refutation of strong moral realism notwithstanding, Anscombe 
argues something that is virtually the opposite of what has been going around 
in the last decades under the label anti-realism. In current Anglo-Saxon jargon 
this would be called – indeed with some useless confusion – one more kind of 
“naturalistic realism”. A better phrase might be “everyday-life realism”, 
implying that there are things like health, well-being, life, freedom and joy – 
those things that Aristotle and Aquinas called “human goods” – and that such 
words as “owes”, “ought” and “duty” make perfectly sense even without any 
assumption of some kind of special entities behind them, nor are they 
conventional, arbitrary, fictitious since we ascribe them the meaning they have 
in everyday language.  
The above may be Anscombe’s argument at its best. Yet, she might hardly 
be said to have helped her readers in getting it right. This may depend on her 
Wittgensteinian taste for cryptic expressions but also on her attempt to 
combine Wittgensteinian with Thomist ways of thinking. The trouble for the 
reader is her lack of clearness about the points where Wittgenstein did not go 
far enough and those where Aquinas went simply wrong. This failure may 
arguably be accounted for in biographical terms, depending on deep affection 
and respect in the former case and on a fear of not looking as orthodox as any 
Catholic-born traditionalist would have been in the latter, but biographical 
causes can hardly provide reasons of any kind.  
This unresolved tension opened the door for diverging moral ontologies, 
proposed by fellow-travellers and followers. A revealing case is Geach’s, who, 
two decades after his 1956 brilliant refutation of Moore, ventured into writing 
a systematic book on ethics where he argues that we need the virtues for the 
kind of arguments hinted at by Anscombe in the abovementioned pregnant-
women-and-athletes passage, that is, because we need them. Need is “a 
teleological notion: necessity for the attainment of an end”100. He declares that 
it makes good sense to ask “What are men for?”101, and goes as far as declaring 
that we need the virtues as bees need stings, that is, we need them for 
individual human flourishing and besides as tools for the preservation of the 
species or preconditions for carrying out collective enterprises102, which is in 
turn justified by the species-trait that imposes on us, among other things, also 
concern for others103. Thus virtue is built-in in our species, and the source of 
the prescriptive force of ethics lies in the species itself, understood in a wide 
 
100 P. Geach, The Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) p. 9. 
101 Ibid., p. 12. 
102 Ibid., p. 16. 
103 Ibid., p. 17. 
80        SERGIO CREMASCHI 
 
sense, both biological and cultural, but nonetheless with all serious problems 
arising from such strong grounding of ethics in ontology. Such a possibility 
had been just tentatively explored by Anscombe with acute awareness of the 
work still to be done if we are to prove that this direction of inquiry is a fruitful 
one104, and carried instead to its full consequences by Geach with all the open 
questions to be expected. Another case is MacIntyre’s swinging between 
refusal of Aristotelian teleology as a basis for virtue theory in After Virtue and 
his U-turn toward an objective teleological structure of the world in Dependent 
Rational Animals105. The anti-Kantian blind alley suggested by Anscombe has 
been explored in depth by Foot in her own theory of morality as a system of 
hypothetical imperatives and its following revision106. A more interesting way 
out of the conundrum has been marked by Hursthouse with her view of ethics 
as Neurathian self-transformation of morality within morality itself, thus 
leaving her own kind of everyday-life realism or “naturalism” the more 
tractable status of a transcendental assumption instead of that of a theoretical 
claim107. 
After 1958 Anscombe never planned a systematic ethical work, even though 
ethics was always one of her main concerns and – surprisingly enough – went 
on doing ethics in spite of her first thesis that had announced that we should 
ban it from our minds. She came back to it on several occasions, on some of 
them with remarkably balanced pieces such as those on the status of embryo 
and euthanasia where she proved how Wittgenstein’s lesson may be of use in 
applied ethics by showing how solution of theoretical uncertainties may be not 
indispensable in order to reach “practical certainties”108. On other occasions, 
she simply awoke the same metaphysical ghosts she had been trying to 
exorcize in 1958, for example when contrasting some “virtues, like honesty 
about property, and sobriety”, allegedly “utilitarian in character”, that is, 
aimed at promoting the “material well-ordering of human life”, with others, 
such as respect for human life and chastity that are “supra-utilitarian and 
 
104 C. Vogler, “Modern Moral Philosophy Again: Isolating the Promulgation Problem”, pp. 
358-362. 
105 A. MacIntyre After Virtue (1981) (Notre Dame, IND: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2007); Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (Chicago, ILL: 
Open Court, 1999). 
106 Foot “Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives”; Natural Goodness. 
107 R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
108 G.E.M. Anscombe, “The Early Embryo. Theoretical Doubts and Practical Certainties”, in 
Faith in a Hard Ground, Essays on Religion, Philosophy and Ethics, ed. by M. Geach and L. 
Gormally (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008) 214-223; “Murder and the Morality of Euthanasia”, 
ibid., 261-277. 
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hence mystical”109. Such fluctuations – I suggest – may depend on emergence 
at different times either of her “official” moral ontology centred on 
Aristotelian necessity or of the “semi-official” moral ontology centred on 
theistic necessity arising from divine promulgation.  
By way of conclusion, Anscombe’s answer to the question of the status of 
morality suffers from an unresolved tension between outright non-realism and 
naturalistic realism, or between Wittgenstein/Schopenhauer and Aquinas. In 
more detail, if her claim on the status of duty in its viable sense, the 
Aristotelian one, is that it consists of necessity grounded in needs, then the 
missing links in her argument are still how are human goods recognized to be 
such and what is the individual’s motivation for cooperating in providing 
human goods instead of being a free-rider.  
8. A TENSION BETWEEN THE LAW-VIEW AND THE NEED-VIRTUE-
RULE VIEW 
An important part of the argument in “Modern Moral Philosophy” rests on 
the (successful or failed) proof of the fact that “modern” moral philosophy is so 
shallow because of being squashed by the weight of a notion, the emphatic 
ought, which turns out to be no more than an empty word. Her real target 
consists in a couple of notions highly popular at her time and place, Hume’s 
law and the naturalistic fallacy. The implication she is constantly drawing is, 
yet, that modern ethics as a whole – including thinkers she does not really 
know such as Moses Mendelsohn, Kant, Price and Whewell – has gone astray, 
that it stands on no firmer basis than unaware secularized Christian dogma 
and needs to be substituted with a grand return to robust Aristotelian 
guidelines for human flourishing.  
The serious problems with her argument are: first, that her textual 
reconstruction is defective, misunderstanding Kant110, ignoring the 
intuitionists, misreading the early Stoics as proponents of a divine-law view; 
secondly, that the historical reconstruction is flawed by defective knowledge of 
the history of Christian theology and none at all of the Hebrew Bible and the 
Rabbinic literature111, by strange ideas about Reformed moral theology, 
 
109 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Contraception and Chastity”, The Human World, 7 (1972) 9-30, p. 
22.  
110 On comparative closeness between Anscombe and the real Kant, cf R. Teichman, The 
Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe, p. 121. 
111 Ibid., pp. 26-28. 
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declared on rather dubious authorities to be a kind of antinomianism112, and 
by the unverified idea that eighteenth-century European culture, or at least 
philosophy, was secularized and Christian morality had left only relics113. 
The merit of Anscombe’s reconstruction is having looked at the British 
discussion with an outsider’s eye while being enough of an insider as to call for 
counter-objections instead of silence. Thus, at her best she laid bare the 
shortcomings of crude naturalistic realism that identifies the good with 
pleasure as well as of confused non-naturalistic realism postulating the 
existence of unnecessary mysterious entities.  
Her overall diagnosis is, yet, not just based on inaccurate textual 
interpretation and historical reconstruction but also incurably flawed in its 
theoretical claims as they have been de facto formulated. In more detail, once 
the historical argument that provides much of the basis for her three theses 
had been amended, she should have had to choose among two incompatible 
options between which she recurrently wavers, namely: 
A. The thesis that the same commands and prohibitions that a law view 
of ethics would prescribe are accessible to human cognitive capacities 
with their own “motive force” (the Kantian Triebfeder) expressed in the 
language of virtues and needs, but such an ethic would be identical to a 
divine law ethics in the Jewish and Christian tradition, which would add 
no more than an additional “moving force” to the same body of 
prescriptions, or peculiar “motives, meaning, spirit and purpose of the 
moral life”114; 
B. The thesis that a law view of ethics requires a God as an enacting 
authority and ethics and the divine law-giver are indissolubly tied so 
that the former cannot exist in a non-corrupted shape without the latter. 
I have illustrated how Anscombe does on more than one occasion adopt 
thesis A. Unlike Peter Geach, she apparently never explicitly defends thesis B. 
In fact Geach argued at least on one occasion against Socrates’s claim in the 
Eutyphro, namely that what pleases the Gods pleases them because it is right 
 
112 To prove that belief in divine law “was substantially given up among Protestants at the 
time of the Reformation” she refers to “the decree of Trent against the teaching that Christ was 
only to be trusted in as mediator, not obeyed as legislator” (G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral 
Philosophy”, pp. 176-177 and 177 fn.) as if the Council of Trent could be a taken as a reliable 
source on Protestant doctrines by any apprentice historian of Chrisitanity; on divine law cf. Ch. 
Pigden, “Anscombe on Ought”, pp. 35-37; Diamond, “The Dog that Gave Himself the Moral 
Law”, pp. 162-165. 
113 Ch. Pigden, “Anscombe on Ought”, pp. 32-35. 
114 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Authority in morals”, p. 50. 
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and not vice versa, and for him faith in a provident God provides the only 
possible motivation for refusal of the consequentialist case for making the most 
repugnant action right in case of extreme necessity115. Anscombe’s claims never 
went so far. She argued at most that an argument frequently referred to as 
decisive is not acceptable. Her argument is that 
If someone does have a divine law conception of ethics, all the same, he has to agree 
that he has to have a judgment that he ought (morally ought) to obey the divine law; so 
his ethic is in exactly the same position as any other116. 
Her objection to this argument is that the notion “morally ought” is devoid 
of any content, not that without faith in divine providence we would have a 
reason to heed in extreme cases to the consequentialist enticement to do evil 
that good may come, and thus her position is different from Geach’s. One may 
add that she appeals in support of her own anti-consequentialist position to the 
authority of Aristotle, for whom there were actions that were to be rejected as 
such on the basis of their very definition117. 
Thus, on principle Anscombe defends the existence of natural morality, 
qualifying it as one construed in the language of virtues, needs and rules of 
games, but no less equipped with its own moral absolutes not different from 
those of a divine law view. She contrasts to it the divine law view as adding one 
more source of motivation, that is, as allowing for a conception of what 
humans qua humans need as also commanded by a legitimate authority and 
thus, and only on this basis, also expressed in the language of law.  
A different story is the story of Anscombe’s interventions in ethical 
discussion after 1958, a few of them remarkably balanced and others heavily 
suffering from her willingness to argue, on the basis of purely philosophical 
arguments, conclusions she firmly believes must be identical with those of the 
Catholic Magisterium. The pieces on contraception are the worst among these, 
and here the 1958 rather plausible defence of a kind of Aristotelian “moral 
absolutes”, a class of actions that cannot be practised in a middle way, but 
simply must not be done, is dropped in favour of a defence of the existence of 
 
115 P.T. Geach, “The moral law and the law of God”, in God and the Soul (London: 
Routledge, 1969) p. 170; for plausible criticism cf M.B. O’Brien, “On Obligation and the 
Virtues of Law”, pp. 95-97. 
116 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, p. 179.  
117 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1107a 12–14; cf G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral 
Philosophy”, pp. 193 and 196; for comments cf R. Teichmann, The Philosophy of Elizabeth 
Anscombe, pp. 121-122. 
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moral absolutes as a prolegomenon to justification without argument of any 
prohibition whatsoever because one cannot do “evil” that good may come118.  
This is not meant to deny that Anscombe’s work in ethics carried a number 
of fruitful suggestions. It is not by chance that she succeeded in stirring up a 
hornet’s nest. But her most felicitous suggestions provide reasons, more than 
for resurrection of Aristotelian virtue ethics, for a revival of something that – 
as suggested by Alan Donagan – had always been there, namely, natural 
morality, or better autonomous ethics, exemplified by a tradition ranging from 
Panetius and Cicero to Kant and Price where also Aristotle and Aquinas could 
find a reasonably comfortable place.  
9. CONCLUSIONS 
A rational reconstruction of Anscombe’s ethics, when taken at its best, may 
be the following: 
1. There are no moral laws. There are objective recommendations 
based on Aristotelian not-emphatic should, ought or must (in order 
to be a fully human being I should do y). 
2. These recommendations do not relate solely to consequences of 
actions but are conferred their cogent character by a number of 
different considerations; they do not allow all kinds of possible 
actions; some actions are in themselves inconceivable whatever the 
consequences. 
3. Good or duty do not constitute the raw material out of which such 
necessity is made; Aristotelian modals relate to a plurality of 
characteristics of actions (just, chaste etc.); talk of virtue serves only 
to highlight such diversity but does not imply that the virtues are the 
main notions in an adequate ethical theory. 
4. To characterize these recommendations as laws is a mistake arising 
from a disease of language that leads to understand as conceivable 
prescriptions that are in fact unconceivable; yet, these laws can be 
legitimately considered to exist by those who affirm the existence of 
a divine law-giver; thus for theists the same contents of Aristotelian 
necessity can be construed as a system of laws or commands, but this 
does not make any difference in what it forbids or commands but 
does make a difference as to spirit and its motivation. 
 
118 S. Cremaschi, “Elizabeth Anscombe on Consequentialism and Absolute Prohibitions”, pp. 
28-30. 
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Against the ethical theory reconstructed above a few objections may be 
raised: 
1. As in a democratic political society I recognize laws without 
affirming the existence of a law-giver above myself – which means 
both I and We – as a member of the universal community of beings 
endowed with practical wisdom, I can consider myself a member of 
a community of law-givers. 
2. Once this objection has been formulated, the critique of spurious 
moral realism would remain valid; the validity of a not-exclusively-
moral realism such as the one defended by Anscombe does not 
imply the spurious character of any kind of theory claiming the 
existence of moral laws without the assertion of the existence of God. 
3. Anscombe at her best is a consistent supporter of the existence of a 
natural morality in the wake of Thomas (and, without knowing it, de 
Vio, William of Ockham, William Whewell, Moses Mendelsohn, and 
Immanuel Kant) and an enemy of any extreme voluntarism of the 
Augustinian kind. As such, she could have taught a lesson of 
universalism, liberal neutrality and toleration to her fellow-Catholics. 
4. Historically given Anscombe, yet, often insists on replacing the 
phrase natural law with the phrase divine law, repeating at first sight 
the same claims put forth by Aquinas but giving the argument an 
opposite direction; that is, where Thomas argues that the law of 
God, for anyone who admits his existence, prescribes the same 
actions as those commanded by sound reason, sometimes Anscombe 
contrasts prescriptions made by consequentialism, arising out of a 
disease of language, not to a set of prescriptions based on argument 
not vitiated by linguistic confusion but instead to divine law. 
5. In addition, while in some places she says that God's law has no 
content different from that of natural morality, in other places at 
least she does not overtly refute Geach’s fallacious argument 
according to which, in order to remain faithful to the moral law even 
in case an extreme evil should be avoided, we need to believe in the 
existence of divine providence that will prevent the extreme evil to 
happen. 
6. And finally, she repeatedly confuses the plain Aristotelian doctrine 
of existence of classes of actions that are vicious in themselves with 
the obscure medieval doctrine of the intrinsece malum or of the 
existence of prohibitions valid semper ac ad semper, a doctrine that 
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is a jumble of logical fallacies and has been used as a justification for 
those pronouncements of the Catholic Magisterium teaching that 
are devoid of any firmer ground than an earlier pronouncement by 
the Magisterium itself.  
7. The divine-law view of ethics does not mirror any consistent body of 
beliefs shared in the Hebrew-Christian religious tradition, not to 
mention the Stoics; in this tradition one may find a divine command 
doctrine (having to do with faith but little with morality), and then 
various moral doctrines centred on divine instruction, wisdom, 
God’s imitation, God’s and one’s neighbour’s love; just in 
Scholasticism one first meets a natural-law doctrine, quite 
respectable and yet somewhat wider than Anscombe’s divine law; 
and the suggestion may be not out of place that the divine-law 
doctrine is superadded and unnecessary. 
